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(1) 
 
BLINDED BY THE LIGHT: THE THIRD CIRCUIT CURTAILS THE 
INDEPENDENT RICCI DEFENSE IN NAACP v. NORTH HUDSON 
REGIONAL FIRE & RESCUE 
DOUGLAS A. BEHRENS! 
I. DEFINING THE CONTOURS OF RACE IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE: IS IT 
STILL BLACK AND WHITE? 
“Prejudice is a burden which confuses the past, threatens the future, and 
renders the present inaccessible.”1  The statistics are telling.2  Not only does 
the median black worker earn 20% less than the median white worker on a 
weekly basis, but only 2.8% of this country’s chief executives are black, and 
black workers are almost twice as likely as white workers to be unemployed.3 
While private employers certainly contributed to this racial disparity, pub-
lic employers are also responsible.4  Congress recognized several decades ago 
that “employment discrimination in State and local governments is more perva-
sive than in the private sector.”5  Public employers often made personnel deci-
sions based on “criteria unrelated to job performance,” which “entrench[ed] 
 !   The author would like to thank Professor Tuan Samahon and the editors of the Villa-
nova Law Review for their helpful comments and editorial advice throughout the writing pro-
cess.  This Casebrief would not have been possible without the love and unwavering support 
of the author’s family. 
1. MAYA ANGELOU, ALL GOD’S CHILDREN NEED TRAVELING SHOES (1969), reprinted 
in THE COLLECTED AUTOBIOGRAPHIES OF MAYA ANGELOU 881, 1009 (2004). 
2. For a discussion of employment statistics in the United States, see infra note 3 and 
accompanying text. 
3. See U.S BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT 1032, 
LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY, 2010, at 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsrace2010.pdf (stating that unemployment rate is 16% for blacks, 
12.5% for Hispanics, 8.7% for whites, and 7.5% for Asians); U.S BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT 1031, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS IN 
2010, at 59 (2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2010.pdf (listing median 
weekly earnings for blacks and whites as $611 and $765, respectively); U.S BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNUAL AVERAGES: CPS 
TABLE 11—EMPLOYED PERSONS BY DETAILED OCCUPATION, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC OR 
LATINO ETHNICITY 14 (2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.pdf (reporting 
that only 2.8% of chief executives are black, 3.2% are Asian, and 4.8% are Hispanic); see also 
Akilah Johnson, Fears Raised over Future of Minority Workforce, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2010, 
at 1 (suggesting that “[u]nless policy makers, business leaders, and community-based organi-
zations collaborate on ways to prepare them, . . . Boston will have a labor pool of unem-
ployed, underemployed, or unemployable adults”); Racial Disparities Persist in Work Force, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 28, 2009, 
http://www2.timesdispatch.com/business/2009/apr/28/b-race28_20090427-211417-ar-45046/ 
(voicing concerns about future generations). 
4. For a discussion of past instances of discrimination among public employers, see in-
fra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
5. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 15 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2146 
(detailing prevalence of discrimination in public sector).  Six of the seven areas studied by the 
report had an overwhelming black population, yet many of the white-collar jobs were inacces-
sible to minorities.  See id. (recognizing lack of ability for minorities to progress to managerial 
levels). 
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preexisting racial hierarchies.”6  These observations, among others, prompted 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII), which aimed to eliminate racial 
considerations from employment decisions.7  A recent Third Circuit decision 
pitted two Title VII discrimination theories against each other, and will force 
municipalities to reassess racial policies in their hiring and promotional practic-
es.8 
The purpose of Title VII is to create a workplace free of discrimination, 
where race is not a barrier to opportunity.9  The statute originally only prohibit-
ed deliberate discrimination (disparate treatment), which covered intentionally 
discriminatory actions and procedures by employers against members of a pro-
tected class.10  Employers circumvented this by creating preconditions for em-
ployment that, while not facially discriminatory, effectively precluded minori-
ties from gaining employment.11  In response, the Supreme Court proscribed 
6. See 118 CONG. REC. 1817 (1972) (noting that hiring decisions were often made 
based on nepotism or political patronage instead of job-related criteria); Ricci v. DeStefano, 
129 S. Ct. 2658, 2691-92 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that these employment 
practices maintained status quo of de facto segregation). 
7. For a discussion of the goals behind Title VII, see infra note 9 and accompanying 
text. 
8. For a discussion of the significance of the Third Circuit’s decision on litigation strat-
egies in Title VII employment discrimination cases, see infra notes 113-28 and accompanying 
text. 
9. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72 (listing 
creation of appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and harassment in employment 
setting as purposes for Title VII); Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674 (explaining purpose of Title VII as 
creating workplace where race is not barrier to opportunity); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424, 434 (1971) (“‘[T]he very purpose of Title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of 
job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or color.’” (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7247 
(1964))). 
10. Section 703(a) of Title VII provides, in relevant part: 
 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment 
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006); see also McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (explaining five requirements plaintiff must 
satisfy in establishing prima facie case of racial discrimination under disparate treatment theo-
ry).  McDonnell requires a plaintiff to show: 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a 
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifica-
tions, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open 
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of [the plaintiff’s] 
qualifications. 
Id. at 802.  See generally Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate 
Treatment: Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 104-05 (2006) 
(laying out requirements and burdens of proof for disparate treatment claims). 
11. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30 (explaining Title VII’s purpose as removing past 
barriers to minority employment and achieving equality of employment opportunities).  The 
Court further noted that “[u]nder the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, 
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facially neutral requirements to discriminatory actions that were “fair in form 
but discriminatory in operation” (disparate impact), which Congress codified in 
the 1991 amendments to Title VII.12 
But what happens when two different racial groups bring competing dis-
parate treatment and disparate impact claims seeking to compel an employer to 
take mutually exclusive actions—one threatening to sue if an employer takes a 
given action and the other threatening to sue if the employer does not take that 
same action?13  Should one claim trump the other?14  In Ricci v. DeStefano,15 
the first case to address this issue, the Supreme Court articulated a limited de-
fense against a disparate treatment claim where there was a “strong basis in evi-
dence” to believe that not taking the intentionally discriminatory action would 
result in a disparate impact claim.16 
Consider the reverse scenario: Is a requirement that causes a disparate im-
pact permissible if the employer can show a strong basis in evidence that a dis-
parate treatment suit will follow if it does not enforce that requirement?17  In 
August of 2011, the Second Circuit confronted this issue but distinguished it 
from Ricci to avoid applying the new defense.18  This evolving issue arose a 
few months later in the Third Circuit, presenting another pivotal test for the 
fledgling Ricci defense.19  In a case of first impression within the Third Circuit, 
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status 
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”  Id. at 430.  Using this standard, the Court 
found that the employment qualification requirements in that case of a high school degree and 
a qualifying score on professional aptitude tests created a disparate impact.  See id. at 431-36 
(providing how requirements create disparate impact). 
12. Section 703(k) of Title VII states: 
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established 
under this subchapter only if— 
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular em-
ployment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the 
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent 
with business necessity; or 
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph 
(C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent re-
fuses to adopt such alternative employment practice. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (codifying disparate impact analysis developed in Griggs); see also 
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (creating disparate impact theory and providing rationale for barring 
facially neutral requirements that nonetheless disparately impacted minorities). 
13. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2664 (presenting case with factual background analogous to 
hypothetical scenario). 
14. See Joseph A. Seiner & Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald a New Disparate 
Impact?, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2181, 2205 (2010) (questioning whether, and under what circum-
stances, disparate impact liability may trump disparate treatment liability, and vice versa). 
15. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
16. See id. at 2677 (clarifying analysis and creating “strong basis in evidence” standard 
for permitting disparate treatment in light of threatened disparate impact claim). 
17. See Seiner & Gutman, supra note 14, at 2205 (noting that Ricci’s holding may indi-
cate that Title VII is symmetric).  For a further analysis of the interplay of disparate treatment 
and disparate impact claims, see infra notes 100-09 and accompanying text. 
18. See Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 654 F.3d 200, 209-10 (2d Cir. 2011) (distin-
guishing holding in Ricci and refusing to extend its application). 
19. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis of the breadth of the Ricci defense, 
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the NAACP v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue20 court declined to ex-
tend the independent defense provided by Ricci beyond the facts of that case.21 
The Third Circuit’s decision in North Hudson is consistent with the Second 
Circuit’s approach and represents its willingness to reinforce Title VII’s pur-
pose by narrowly interpreting the defenses to liability.22  Part II of this 
Casebrief reviews the Supreme Court’s development of Title VII jurisprudence 
with a particular focus on the disparate impact analysis and how competing Ti-
tle VII discrimination claims should be adjudicated.23  This section also dis-
cusses how the Second Circuit addressed a similar issue to that faced in North 
Hudson, and describes the Third Circuit’s approach to municipal residency re-
quirements—the employment practice giving rise to the disparate impact claim 
in North Hudson.24  Part III analyzes the Third Circuit’s reasoning in North 
Hudson, its narrow interpretation of the independent Ricci defense, and its 
treatment of residency requirements.25  Part IV provides key insights from 
North Hudson’s holding and offers guidance to practitioners on how the case 
will affect future Title VII cases in the Third Circuit.26  Finally, Part V summa-
rizes North Hudson’s holding and potential impact.27 
II. COLORING WITHIN THE LINES: A BACKGROUND ON TITLE VII’S THEORIES 
OF LIABILITY AND AN OVERVIEW OF RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS 
Title VII has evolved since its creation to cover both intentional and facial-
ly neutral discriminatory practices.28  In Ricci, these two theories of liability 
see infra notes 80-109 and accompanying text. 
20. 665 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 2011). 
21. See id. at 484 (distinguishing Ricci and declining to permit practice that results in 
disparate impact on grounds that disparate treatment suit was threatened); see also Jerry 
DeMarco, NHRFR Discriminates Against Blacks in Hiring, Federal Panel Finds, CLIFFVIEW 
PILOT, (Dec. 13, 2011, 5:15 PM), http://www.cliffviewpilot.com/hudson/3139-nhrfr-
discriminates-against-blacks-in-hiring-federal-panel-finds (noting key facts that Third Circuit 
used in rendering its decision); Dyanna Quizon, Another Firefighter Discrimination Case: 
North Hudson Not New Haven, FINDLAW: U.S. THIRD CIRCUIT BLOG (Dec. 15, 2011, 3:02 
PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/third_circuit/2011/12/another-firefighter-discrimination-case-
north-hudson-not-new-haven.html (explaining Third Circuit’s holding). 
22. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s narrow interpretation of possible defenses to 
Title VII employment discrimination actions and how this is consistent with the purposes of 
Title VII, see infra notes 110-28 and accompanying text. 
23. For a discussion of the Supreme Court precedent on Title VII discrimination claims, 
see infra notes 28-55 and accompanying text. 
24. For a discussion of the Second Circuit’s analysis of the Ricci defense and the Third 
Circuit’s jurisprudence on municipal residency requirements, see infra notes 56-79 and ac-
companying text. 
25. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s decision in North Hudson, see infra notes 80-
109 and accompanying text. 
26. For a discussion of disparate treatment and disparate impact jurisprudence in the 
Third Circuit and guidance to practitioners litigating these issues in the future, see infra notes 
110-40 and accompanying text. 
27. For a discussion of the bleak prospects for defendants in employment discrimination 
cases brought under Title VII, see infra notes 142-51 and accompanying text. 
28. For a review of Title VII and the creation of the disparate impact theory in response 
to persistent employment discrimination, see infra notes 32-55 and accompanying text. 
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were alleged in a competing manner against the same employer, and the Su-
preme Court created a strong basis in evidence test to balance the theories.29  
The Second Circuit addressed a similar issue but found the test unnecessary be-
cause it distinguished Ricci.30  Of crucial importance to North Hudson was the 
Third Circuit’s analysis of residency requirements that created a situation in 
which the Ricci defense might apply.31 
A. The Birth of the Disparate Impact Theory: Setting the Stage for a Clash 
with the Disparate Treatment Theory 
The disparate treatment theory, which usually applies to subjective em-
ployment standards, arises when an employer intentionally treats a group of 
people less favorably on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.32  This form of discrimination was barred in the original Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.33  Unfortunately, employers bypassed this by instituting require-
ments that, while not facially discriminatory, had the invidious effect of main-
taining the status quo of racial discrimination.34  To stop this, the Supreme 
Court created the disparate impact theory in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,35 
which allowed plaintiffs to establish discrimination without showing a discrimi-
natory intent.36  The disparate impact theory was later codified in the 1991 
29. For an analysis of the interplay between disparate treatment and disparate impact 
claims, see infra notes 46-55 and accompanying text. 
30. For a discussion of the Second Circuit’s approach to conflicting disparate treatment 
and disparate impact claims, see infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text. 
31. For a detailed analysis of the Third Circuit’s approach to residency requirements in 
the context of municipal hiring, see infra notes 68-79 and accompanying text. 
32. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (ex-
plaining that proof of discriminatory intent is crucial for establishing disparate treatment 
claim); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) 
(suggesting that discriminatory motive may sometimes be inferred from differences in treat-
ment). 
33. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (prohibiting 
intentional discrimination on basis of certain immutable characteristics). 
34. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971) (noting that test re-
quirements disqualified African Americans disproportionately more than whites, and that jobs 
in question were filled by white employees as part of longstanding practice of giving prefer-
ence to whites); see also Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to 
the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1482 
(1996) (explaining that elimination of intentional discrimination alone will prove insufficient 
to provide equal opportunities for all races because overt discrimination is not only form of 
discrimination).  Professor Spiropoulos identifies three subtler forms of discrimination that 
must be addressed in addition to intentional discrimination: pretextual, statistical, and uncon-
scious discrimination.  Spiropolous, supra, at 1482.  Pretextual discrimination occurs when 
those who intend to discriminate against minorities mask their manifestations by instituting 
job-neutral criteria that disproportionately disqualify these groups.  See id. (defining 
pretextual discrimination). 
35. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
36. See id. at 429-30 (identifying new disparate impact doctrine).  The Duke Power 
Company had openly discriminated on the basis of race prior to the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.  See id. at 426-27 (describing district court’s findings).  In response to the 
Civil Rights Act’s passage, Duke Power required a high school diploma and a passing score 
on certain standardized tests to work in the more desirable departments of the company.  See 
id. at 427 (noting that Duke Power had five departments, but that African Americans were 
5
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amendments to the Civil Rights Act.37  While disparate impact claims provide 
an alternative method to combat discrimination, scholars have noted that they 
can be more difficult to prove than disparate treatment cases.38 
Griggs and its progeny have established a three-prong test for analyzing 
disparate impact claims.39  Initially, the plaintiff bears the burden of establish-
ing a prima facie case by showing that the specific facially neutral employment 
practice at issue is causing a significant discriminatory effect.40  In most cases, 
this can be demonstrated by showing substantial statistical disparities between 
the employer’s work force and the relevant labor market.41  However, an em-
ployer may not skirt liability simply because the practices did not actually result 
in a significant racial disparity.42 
only permitted to work in Labor Department, where highest paying job paid less than lowest 
paying job in other four departments).  While requiring a passing score on standardized tests 
was not facially discriminatory, the court found that it operated to freeze the status quo of pri-
or discriminatory employment practices and invalidated the requirements under the new dis-
parate impact theory.  See id. at 430-35 (stating Court’s holding); see also Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (“[T]he necessary premise of the disparate 
impact approach is that some employment practices, adopted without a deliberately discrimi-
natory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.”). 
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (prohibiting employment practices that cause disparate 
impact on minorities, regardless of whether employer had intention to discriminate). 
38. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 701, 734 (2006) (arguing that disparate impact claims require higher standard of proof 
than disparate treatment claims, which is particularly significant “given that employment dis-
crimination claims themselves are notoriously difficult to prove”). 
39. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 995 (providing prongs for disparate impact analysis); Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (same); see also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 
429-33 (laying foundation for disparate impact claims).  See generally Susan S. Grover, The 
Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387, 
393-95 (1996) (discussing required elements for establishing disparate impact). 
40. See § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (imposing requirement on plaintiffs to “demonstrate[] 
that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact” (em-
phasis added)); Watson, 487 U.S. at 994 (declaring that plaintiffs are “responsible for isolating 
and identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any ob-
served statistical disparities”); see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) (illus-
trating that plaintiffs must show that “facially neutral employment practice had a significantly 
discriminatory impact”); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32 (prohibiting “not only overt discrimina-
tion but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation”). 
41. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994-95 (requiring plaintiffs to offer “statistical evidence of 
a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of 
applicants . . . because of their membership in a protected group” and that disparities “must be 
sufficiently substantial that they raise such an inference of causation”); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. 
v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (stating that statistical comparison must be be-
tween racial composition of employer’s workforce and that of relevant labor market).  For 
example, significant disparities between the racial composition of a particular school’s teach-
ing staff and the racial composition of the qualified public school teacher population in the 
local labor market could establish the first prong of a disparate impact claim.  See Hazelwood 
Sch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 308 (offering example of relevant statistical comparison).  A compari-
son between the racial composition of the school’s teaching staff and the racial composition of 
the surrounding town, however, would not have evidentiary value because the general popula-
tion does not necessarily represent the relevant applicant pool.  See id. (noting ineffective 
comparison for purposes of disparate impact claim). 
42. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 451 (“The suggestion that disparate impact should be meas-
ured only at the bottom line ignores the fact that Title VII guarantees these individual re-
6
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Upon a plaintiff’s successful showing of a prima facie case, the burden 
shifts to the employer to prove that the challenged requirement or practice has a 
“manifest relationship to the employment in question” and that it is consistent 
with a business necessity.43  Commonsense assertions of business necessity are 
insufficient, and courts have instead required empirical proof relating the hiring 
criteria to predicted job performance.44  Finally, even if the employer sustains 
its burden, the plaintiff may still prevail by offering a legitimate, less discrimi-
natory alternative.45 
In 2009, the Supreme Court considered how disparate treatment claims in-
teract with disparate impact claims.46  In Ricci, the city of New Haven offered a 
promotional exam for firefighters testing the knowledge, skills, and abilities 
necessary for the promotion.47  Based on the exam results, no black candidates 
spondents the opportunity to compete equally with white workers on the basis of job-related 
criteria.”); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978) (“A racially balanced 
work force cannot immunize an employer from liability for specific acts of discrimination.”). 
43. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 446-47 (emphasizing requirements to establish business ne-
cessity defense); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32 (forcing employer to show business reason for 
discrimination and opining that “[t]he touchstone is business necessity.  If an employment 
practice which operates to exclude [minorities] cannot be shown to be related to job perfor-
mance, the practice is prohibited.”); see also Laya Sleiman, Note, A Duty to Make Reasonable 
Efforts and a Defense of the Disparate Impact Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2677, 2684 (2004) (commenting on burden shift after prima face case 
has been established). 
44. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977) (rejecting proffered business 
necessity defense that minimum height and weight requirements for correctional officers 
“have a relationship to strength, a sufficient but unspecified amount of which is essential to 
effective job performance”); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436 (insisting that requirements be “demon-
strably a reasonable measure of job performance”).  But see N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 
440 U.S. 568, 594 (1979) (accepting safety of disabled passengers and efficiency as legitimate 
business necessity in permitting transit authority to exclude methadone users from employ-
ment); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250-51 (1976) (finding satisfactory business ne-
cessity for written test related to success at police training academy, despite fact that it was 
not necessarily related to actual performance as police officer in field).  See generally Grover, 
supra note 39, at 389-92 (analyzing business necessity defense and noting that its application 
varies); Spiropoulos, supra note 34, at 1484 (articulating two possible interpretations of busi-
ness necessity defense). 
45. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009) (recognizing that “if an em-
ployer met its burden by showing that its practice was job-related, the plaintiff was required to 
show a legitimate alternative that would have resulted in less discrimination”); Teal, 457 U.S. 
at 447 (“[T]he plaintiff may prevail, if he shows that the employer was using the practice as a 
mere pretext for discrimination.”); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329 (explaining that plaintiff has op-
portunity to show that different employment practice would achieve employer’s legitimate 
interest but without discriminatory effect); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 
(1975) (noting that plaintiff may prevail on disparate impact claim despite proof of legitimate 
business reason for discriminatory actions). 
46. For a discussion of the interplay of disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, 
see infra notes 47-55 and accompanying text. 
47. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2665-66 (explaining how New Haven hired independent 
firm to construct and administer test with special emphasis on ensuring that racial minorities 
would not be disadvantaged by examination).  The firm took painstaking steps to ensure that 
the examination was fair, including: deliberately oversampling minority firefighters when 
conducting its job analysis to determine what tasks and abilities were important for promotion, 
drafting the exam exclusively from a list of sources approved by the New Haven fire chief, 
writing the test below a tenth grade reading level, providing candidates with the source mate-
7
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were eligible for a promotion, and the city faced competing threats of legal ac-
tion regarding what to do with the tests.48  The black firefighters claimed that 
the exam discriminated against them under a disparate impact theory and de-
manded that the test results be discarded.49  Conversely, the white and Hispanic 
firefighters who scored well enough to be promoted threatened to bring a dis-
parate treatment lawsuit if their promotions were denied based on the exam’s 
racial disparities.50 
New Haven elected to nullify the exams and the white and Hispanic fire-
fighters brought suit; the district court granted, and the Second Circuit upheld, 
summary judgment in favor of New Haven.51  The Supreme Court reversed, 
over a strong dissenting opinion, finding that the city’s decision to disregard the 
results, by relying on statistics showing that “too many whites and not enough 
minorities” would have been promoted based on the exam results, was based on 
race.52  The Court held that disparate treatment—in this case, refusing to certify 
the exam on the basis of race—could only be justified if there was a “strong ba-
sis in evidence” to believe that not certifying the exam would result in a dispar-
ate impact claim.53  In this instance, a suit from the black firefighters who al-
leged that the facially neutral exam unfairly discriminated against them 
represented the disparate impact claim.54  The Court concluded that New Ha-
rial for the questions, and even indicating the specific chapters from which the questions were 
drawn.  Id. at 2665-66. 
48. See id. at 2670-71 (noting that twenty-five out of forty-three whites, six out of nine-
teen blacks, and three out of fifteen Hispanics passed the exam).  The city held extensive pub-
lic meetings, complete with expert testimony and raucous behavior from both sides, on 
whether the test results should stand.  See id. (explaining context in which debate took place). 
49. See id. at 2664 (stating legal argument asserted by black firefighters). 
50. See id. at 2664-66 (discussing threatened legal action from white and Hispanic fire-
fighters); see generally Richard A. Epstein, Ricci v. DeStefano: Getting Back to First Princi-
ples of Affirmative Action, FORBES, June 29, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/29/ricci-
destefano-new-haven-supreme-court-affirmative-action-opinions-columnists-firefighters.html 
(critiquing Title VII in general and suggesting that facts of Ricci expose Title VII’s framework 
as incapable of properly governing disputes of this kind). 
51. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2671 (illustrating procedural history). 
52. See id. at 2673 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 
F. Supp. 2d 142, 152 (D. Conn. 2006), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2658) (pointing out city’s motive in 
nullifying exam results).  The dissenters and many scholars, however, strongly disagreed with 
the majority’s conclusion.  See id. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s order and 
opinion, I anticipate, will not have staying power.”); Allen R. Kamp, Ricci v. DeStefano and 
Disparate Treatment: How the Case Makes Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause Un-
workable, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (criticizing Ricci holding as having potential to “ut-
terly defeat” efforts at ending discrimination); Nancy L. Zisk, Failing the Test: How Ricci v. 
DeStefano Failed to Clarify Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Law, 34 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 27, 28 (2011) (asserting that Ricci has turned employment discrimination theory on its 
head). 
53. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677 (“[B]efore an employer can engage in intentional dis-
crimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate im-
pact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to a dis-
parate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.”); see also 
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Finds Bias Against White Firefighters, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 
2009, at A1 (noting that new standard will make it more difficult for employers to discard ex-
am results once tests are given, even if they have negative impact on minority group). 
54. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2677 (explaining basis for potential disparate impact claim). 
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ven failed to satisfy the strong basis in evidence standard and ordered the city to 
certify the exam results.55 
B. Seeing Shades of Grey: The Second Circuit Interprets the Ricci Defense 
In Briscoe v. City of New Haven,56 the Second Circuit was squarely pre-
sented with the reverse of the situation addressed by the Supreme Court in Ric-
ci.57  The Briscoe court had to decide whether a party facing a disparate impact 
claim could avoid liability by showing, by a strong basis in evidence, that dis-
continuing the practice would lead to a disparate treatment claim.58  Briscoe 
was a black firefighter in the same fire department at issue in Ricci.59  After the 
Ricci decision compelled New Haven to certify the promotional exam results, 
Briscoe brought suit alleging that those tests caused a disparate impact on black 
firefighters because of the weight given to the oral and written components.60  
The district court concluded that Ricci precluded Briscoe’s claim and dismissed 
his suit, but Briscoe appealed to the Second Circuit.61 
As a threshold matter, the Second Circuit held that the Ricci decision did 
not preclude Briscoe’s claim because he was not a party in that case.62  The 
court then analyzed Ricci and determined that it did not provide a symmetrical 
defense.63  The court reasoned that Ricci provided no support for the proposi-
tion that requirements that caused a disparate impact were permitted if there 
was a strong basis in evidence to believe that disparate treatment liability would 
result from the elimination of those requirements.64  Unlike disparate impact 
55. See id. at 2664 (stating Court’s holding); see also Overview, in [1 Analysis of Fed-
eral Law] Empl. Discrimination Coordinator (West) § 19:1 (2012) (explaining that city would 
only have been liable if examinations were neither job-related nor consistent with its proffered 
business necessity, or if equally valid but less discriminatory alternatives existed).  The Su-
preme Court found that there was not a strong basis in the evidence to establish that the exam 
was deficient with respect to either of those qualifications.  See id. (finding that New Haven 
failed to justify intentional discrimination against white and Hispanic firefighters under new 
test). 
56. 654 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2011). 
57. See id. at 205 (noting that New Haven advocated for broad, two-way reading of 
Ricci’s defense so that it would shield against liability in current case). 
58. For a further discussion of the competing disparate treatment and disparate impact 
claims in a setting opposite to Ricci, see infra notes 59-67 and accompanying text. 
59. See Briscoe, 654 F.3d at 201-02 (detailing factual background of case). 
60. See id. at 202 (explaining plaintiff’s allegation that 40% and 60% weights given to 
oral and written sections, respectively, were arbitrary, unrelated to job requirements, and con-
trary to industry norm of 70% for oral and 30% for written).  Briscoe scored the highest of any 
candidate on the oral portion of the exam, but like many of the other black candidates, per-
formed poorly on the written section.  See Richard Thompson Ford, Now a Black Firefighter 
Is Suing New Haven, SLATE (Oct. 23, 2009, 7:12 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/10/now_a_black_firefigh
ter_is_suing_new_haven.html (describing Briscoe as sympathetic plaintiff who was ineligible 
for promotion based on questionable weighting of exam components). 
61. See Briscoe, 654 F.3d at 202-04 (providing procedural history of case). 
62. See id. at 203 (rejecting preclusion argument because Briscoe was not joined as par-
ty in prior case). 
63. For a discussion of the Second Circuit’s analysis regarding the Ricci defense, see 
infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. 
64. See Briscoe, 654 F.3d at 205-06 (refusing to permit concern over disparate treat-
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liability, which punishes accidental discrimination, disparate treatment liability 
requires intentional actions.65  Therefore, it is difficult to envision how a party 
could offer a strong basis in evidence that the party would intentionally discrim-
inate in the future.66  After holding that disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact claims were not symmetrical for purposes of the Ricci defense, the court 
remanded Briscoe’s case for further proceedings.67 
C. Where Does the Third Circuit Reside on Residency Requirements? 
The Third Circuit’s disparate impact jurisprudence regarding the validity of 
residency requirements was unsettled prior to the decision in North Hudson.68  
In NAACP v. Town of Harrison,69 the Third Circuit invalidated a residency re-
quirement based upon a statistical showing by the plaintiffs that no blacks had 
ever held a uniformed position with the town.70  The court stated that it did not 
matter whether the disparity between the private and municipal workforce was 
thirty percent or five percent; the fact that no black person had ever been hired 
ment liability to erase liability for disparate impact).  First, the court pointed out that Ricci’s 
holding is very narrow and that the city relied on dicta to support its argument.  See id. at 206-
07 (explaining that Ricci’s holding is narrower than what New Haven claimed); Thomas S. 
Marcey, Affirmative Action In Employment Post Ricci v. DeStefano, CONSTR. BRIEFINGS, 
Nov. 2011 (suggesting that district court read favorable portion of Ricci opinion out of context 
from rest of opinion).  Moreover, the parameters defining a disparate impact claim were statu-
tory, whereas case law provided most of the contours of a disparate treatment claim.  See 
Briscoe, 654 F.3d at 207 (providing reason for distinguishing case from Ricci). 
65. See Briscoe, 654 F.3d at 208 (distinguishing requirements and nature of disparate 
treatment and disparate impact claims). 
66. See id. (stating that it is “hard to see how one can adduce a ‘strong basis in evi-
dence’ that oneself will later act with ‘discriminatory intent or motive’” (citation omitted)). 
67. See id. at 209-10 (reversing district court decision and holding that Briscoe may 
assert his disparate impact claim); Luther Turmelle, New Haven Firefighter’s Lawsuit Revived 
by Appeals Court, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Aug. 16, 2011, available at 
http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2011/08/16/news/doc4e49cc7e46a8a434230756.txt (an-
nouncing that Briscoe has opportunity to prove that, with fairly scored test, he is best candi-
date for promotion). 
68. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s removal of certain residency requirements 
and approval of others, see infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.  The North Hudson de-
cision was timely because residency requirements have recently increased due to budget short-
falls in many counties.  See Ricardo Kaulessar, Residency Requirements Cause Controversy, 
HUDSON REP., Jan. 6, 2009, http://hudsonreporter.com/view/full_story/1211333/article-
Residency-requirements-cause-controversy-Bayonne--other-towns-will-force-city-workers-to-
live-here- (observing that towns are addressing budget problems by terminating employees 
who do not comply with residency requirement). 
69. 940 F.2d 792 (3d Cir. 1991). 
70. See id. at 796 (insisting that magnitude of statistical disparity when compared with 
relevant labor market was irrelevant because black persons represented 0% of Harrison’s mu-
nicipal workforce).  The town of Harrison, whose general population was only 0.2% black, 
used a residency requirement that was challenged on the grounds that it had a disparate impact 
on blacks.  See id. at 794-96.  Blacks represented 22% of the private labor force in the town of 
Harrison, and this indicated that black persons were commuting in from other towns to work.  
See id. at 799-800 (suggesting that removing residency requirement would increase employ-
ment of blacks in public-sector workforce); see also Erika L. Wood, Note, Surviving Title VII: 
Defending Municipal Residency Requirements in Minority Communities, 1 RUTGERS RACE & 
L. REV. 427, 428-29 (1999) (noting that residency requirements were especially harmful in 
New Jersey because many towns were segregated by race). 
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for a municipal job in the town of Harrison established the prima facie case de-
manded by the first prong of the disparate impact test.71  The Third Circuit 
went on to find that Harrison failed the second prong of the test because it did 
not prove a manifest relationship between the residency requirement and job 
performance; as a result, the court ordered Harrison to stop using the residency 
requirement as a factor in its hiring process.72 
Conversely, in NAACP v. City of Bayonne,73 the Third Circuit back-
tracked and upheld the validity of a residency requirement because the plaintiff 
failed to produce compelling statistical evidence linking the disparity to the res-
idency requirement.74  The City of Bayonne had previously been sued for its 
racial disparities and had agreed to a settlement that forced the city to suspend 
its residency requirement for four years.75  After the four years elapsed, Ba-
yonne attempted to reinstate the requirement and was sued again under a dis-
parate impact theory.76  During the four years that the residency requirement 
was suspended, the number of black firefighters did not increase, and the num-
ber of black police officers decreased.77  The Third Circuit held that the statis-
tical disparities between the private and public workforces could not be attribut-
ed to the residency requirement because removing the residency requirement 
did not increase the number of black municipal workers.78  Bayonne lent credi-
bility to the notion that other factors may be causing the racial disparities, and it 
permitted the defendants to advocate for a stronger showing of causation before 
removing the residency requirement.79 
 
71. See Harrison, 940 F.2d at 797-800 (eliminating other potential causes for disparity).  
According to the court, the disparity was not attributable to a lack of interest or an unwilling-
ness to commute, as evidenced by the ample means for quick travel between the surrounding 
county and Harrison and the fact that black workers would seek municipal positions if the res-
idency requirement were removed.  See id. at 797 (concluding that residency requirement was 
clear cause of racial disparity between municipal and private workforces in Harrison). 
72. See id. at 801-05 (rejecting need for rapid responses in emergencies, increased ex-
pense of screening applicants, and community loyalty as business justifications).  The Third 
Circuit also noted that there were reasonable alternatives that would achieve the same goals 
without causing a disparate impact.  See id. at 804-05 (dismissing Harrison’s justifications as 
insufficient to condone discriminatory effects produced by residency requirement). 
73. 134 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 1998). 
74. See id. at 117-19 (classifying evidence provided by plaintiff’s expert as “specula-
tive” and “possibilities without any evidential basis”). 
75. See id. at 115 (detailing settlement that required city of Bayonne to eliminate its 
residency requirement and actively recruit black applicants for period of four years). 
76. See id. (reporting that after four-year term expired, city restored residency require-
ment and NAACP sued seeking injunctive relief). 
77. See id. at 115-17 (noting that African American representation in Bayonne police 
department shrank from 3.4% to 1% during four years in which residency requirement was 
not in place). 
78. See id. at 117-21 (rejecting plaintiff’s causation argument and noting that plaintiff 
even conceded at oral argument that New Jersey civil service exam, and not residency re-
quirement, was likely cause of disparity). 
79. See Brief for Appellant at 20, NAACP v. North Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 
F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-3983) (noting that removing residency requirement is not 
always effective at increasing black representation among workforce). 
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III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT DISENTANGLES DISPARATE TREATMENT AND 
DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS IN NAACP V. NORTH HUDSON REGIONAL FIRE & 
RESCUE 
North Hudson, a consortium of five municipalities in New Jersey, utilized a 
residency requirement that screened out potential applicants for positions in the 
North Hudson fire department—a practice used by many other municipalities in 
the state.80  The residency requirement mandated that candidates applying for a 
position with the fire department live in the municipality; once hired, the candi-
dates were free to live anywhere in the state.81  Those candidates who met the 
residency requirement were hired in ranked order based on their combined score 
on physical and written examinations.82  North Hudson’s population was 3.4% 
black, yet the fire department employed only two blacks, which constituted 
0.62% of the fire department’s employees.83  The NAACP and several black 
candidates brought suit alleging that the residency requirement caused the dis-
parate impact on the black applicants.84 
The district court initially granted the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary 
injunction, but while the appeal to the Third Circuit was pending, the Supreme 
Court decided Ricci.85  Six Hispanic firefighters were subsequently permitted 
to intervene with a potential disparate treatment claim if North Hudson decided 
to eliminate the residency requirement based on racial considerations.86  The 
Third Circuit then remanded the case to the district court because Ricci involved 
the overlap of disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.87 
On remand, the district court vacated its preliminary injunction, and both 
parties moved for summary judgment.88  The court granted the plaintiffs’ mo-
tion for summary judgment because the plaintiffs’ expert offered statistical evi-
dence sufficient to prove a prima facie case of disparate impact, and North Hud-
80. See North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 468-69 (establishing facts giving rise to suit and his-
tory of residency requirements).  In 1977, the U.S. Department of Justice sued several New 
Jersey municipalities alleging racial discrimination.  See id. (explaining that part of settlement 
required those municipalities to impose residency requirements). 
81. See id. at 469 (reporting details of residency requirement).  After becoming a mem-
ber of the fire department, some firefighters would live as far as sixty miles away.  See id. 
(providing information on where firefighters lived in relation to town). 
82. See id. (discussing hiring procedure). 
83. See id. at 469-70 (noting racial disparity between general black population and 
black employment in fire department).  The fire department employed 302 firefighters, of 
which 240 were white, 58 were Hispanic, and 2 were black.  See id. at 470 (presenting racial 
demographics of fire department). 
84. See id. at 470 (stating plaintiffs’ theory of liability). 
85. See id. at 470-71 (detailing procedural history). 
86. See id. (explaining that white and Hispanic firefighters threatened suit under dispar-
ate treatment theory if residency requirement were removed on account of race). 
87. See id. (discussing impact of Ricci’s holding on case). 
88. See id. at 471 (noting elimination of preliminary injunction).  The plaintiffs sought 
judgment on their disparate impact claim and a permanent injunction barring use of the resi-
dency requirement.  See id. (laying out plaintiff’s arguments).  North Hudson argued that the 
plaintiffs did not prove a causal connection between the residency requirement and the statis-
tical disparity, contended that it had established a valid business necessity defense, and assert-
ed that Ricci provided a separate defense.  See id. (stating North Hudson’s defenses). 
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son failed to establish a business necessity defense.89  Furthermore, Ricci did 
not provide North Hudson with an independent defense because the removal of 
the residency requirement was in response to a court order and therefore not 
motivated solely by race.90 
The Third Circuit began by determining whether the plaintiffs demonstrat-
ed that the application of a facially neutral standard caused a significantly dis-
criminatory effect on hiring and whether the challenged hiring practice was 
identified as the cause of the disparity.91  Relying on Harrison, the Third Cir-
cuit explained that a black representation among North Hudson’s firefighters of 
only 0.62% was low enough to suggest discrimination.92  The plaintiffs’ expert 
presented evidence that raised an inference of causation by showing the statisti-
cal disparities between the percentage of blacks employed in protective service 
positions in the surrounding community, 37.4%, and the percentage of blacks 
employed by North Hudson as firefighters, 0.62%.93  The Third Circuit found 
Bayonne inapposite because the hiring of only two black firefighters during the 
ten years that the residency requirement was in place implied a causal connec-
tion between the requirement and the disparity.94 
Having concluded that the plaintiffs satisfied the first prong, the court pro-
ceeded to analyze North Hudson’s business necessity defense.95  North Hudson 
needed to demonstrate that the residency requirement defined a minimum quali-
fication for successful job performance and provide reasons for why the qualifi-
cation was necessary to being a firefighter in North Hudson.96  North Hudson 
89. See id. at 470-75 (providing district court’s rationale).  The court explained that the 
plaintiffs’ expert showed both a statistical disparity and a causal link to North Hudson’s resi-
dency requirement.  See id. at 472-75 (classifying disparity as “striking”).  North Hudson 
proffered familiarity with the local geography, swift response times, and the need for a bilin-
gual firefighting force as business necessities for imposing the residency requirement.  See id.  
The court rejected each of these because living in North Hudson was not a “mandatory mini-
mum requirement” and because there were less discriminatory means to achieve these goals.  
See id. 
90. See id. at 475 (indicating that elimination of residency requirement did not present 
North Hudson with independent Ricci defense because court ordered removal). 
91. See id. at 476-81 (explaining burden of proof that plaintiff must meet to sustain dis-
parate impact claim). 
92. See id. at 479 (comparing extremely low number of blacks among workforce to 
number in Harrison and concluding that disparity was sufficient to establish causation). 
93. See id. (noting stark racial disparity).  The plaintiffs’ statistics regarding similar jobs 
in the surrounding area suggested that North Hudson should employ sixty-five blacks in com-
parison to the two it actually employed.  See id. (detailing significant disparity in number of 
firefighters employed by North Hudson when compared to relevant labor market); see also 
Disparate Impact Cases, in [3 Analysis of Federal Law] Empl. Discrimination Coordinator 
(West) § 136:46 (2012) (affirming comparison between number of protected class members in 
workforce at issue and number of protected class members in relevant labor market as means 
of establishing disparate impact claim). 
94. See North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 479 (explaining that, unlike Bayonne, magnitude of 
statistical disparity here established causal connection). 
95. For a discussion of the requirements for the business necessity defense and an ex-
planation of why North Hudson failed to meet the standard, see infra notes 96-99 and accom-
panying text. 
96. See Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 487 (3d Cir. 1999) (specifying 
requirements to establish business necessity defense); NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 940 F.2d 
792, 797-800 (3d Cir. 1991) (same). 
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argued that the residency requirement was essential to the fire department’s op-
eration because it increased the likelihood of a rapid response time due to the 
firefighters’ familiarity with the area, increased the number of Spanish-speaking 
firefighters in an area heavily populated by Hispanics, and fostered community 
pride.97  The Third Circuit found each of these reasons to be insufficient.98  
Because North Hudson failed to establish a business necessity defense, there 
was no need for the plaintiffs to prove a less discriminatory alternative.99 
The Third Circuit factually distinguished Ricci and declined to extend its 
defense to this case.100  In Ricci, New Haven refused to certify the test re-
sults—giving rise to a disparate treatment lawsuit by the white and Hispanic 
firefighters—out of concern that certifying the exam would result in a disparate 
impact claim by black firefighters.101  In comparison, North Hudson utilized a 
residency requirement—causing a disparate impact claim by black firefight-
ers—allegedly because the city wanted to avoid a disparate treatment claim 
brought by white and Hispanic firefighters.102  North Hudson argued that this 
distinction was unimportant because the merits of both competing claims must 
be weighed under the strong basis in evidence standard, thereby making which 
claim came first irrelevant to the outcome.103 
The court found this argument unpersuasive and declined North Hudson’s 
invitation to apply the Ricci defense outside of the particular factual scenario of 
that case.104  In Ricci, New Haven had to choose between two irreconcilable 
97. See North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 481-82 (listing city’s reasoning for why residency 
requirement was justified as business necessity). 
98. See id. (scrutinizing North Hudson’s justifications for its residency requirement).  
The court acknowledged that familiarity with the area would surely increase the fire depart-
ment’s ability to respond quickly to emergencies, but reasoned that this justification was un-
dermined by North Hudson’s decision not to require its firefighters to live in North Hudson 
after they are hired.  See id. at 482.  Moreover, employing Spanish-speaking firefighters in a 
region that is more than sixty percent Hispanic is a plausible justification, but North Hudson 
failed to prove that the residency requirement actually increased the number of Spanish-
speaking firefighters.  See id.  Finally, as explained in Harrison, the court noted that commu-
nity pride cannot justify a discriminatory hiring practice.  See id. (rejecting community pride 
as justification for hiring discrimination); see also Harrison, 940 F.2d at 804 (same). 
99. See North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 482 (noting that defendants failed to rebut prima 
facie disparate impact claim). 
100. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s reason for distinguishing Ricci and finding 
that its defense was inapplicable, see infra notes 101-09 and accompanying text. 
101. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009) (detailing facts that led to 
lawsuit). 
102. See North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 482-83 (explaining that, as in Briscoe, “North Hud-
son seeks to establish a [Ricci] defense in the converse situation” of that presented in Ricci); 
see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 79, at 3-4 (citing disparate treatment liability as rea-
son for not removing residency requirement). 
103. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681 (explaining that holding in Ricci clarified competing 
expectations between disparate treatment and disparate impact claims); see also Brief for Ap-
pellant, supra note 79, at 3-4 (asserting that whether disparate impact or disparate treatment 
claim arose first is of “no legal significance in the application of Ricci”).  According to North 
Hudson, if the merits are analyzed under the strong basis in evidence standard when compet-
ing claims are brought, then the merits of the independent claims, not the temporal order of 
filing, should determine the case.  See id. (explaining North Hudson’s argument). 
104. For a discussion of why the Third Circuit rejected North Hudson’s contention that 
Ricci was applicable in this case, see infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. 
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alleged errors prior to receiving any judicial guidance.105  Conversely, North 
Hudson’s only action was its use of a residency requirement that caused a dis-
parate impact; it had not yet taken steps to remedy the discrimination caused by 
the residency requirement.106  Therefore, North Hudson faced only a disparate 
impact claim and not competing claims as was the case in Ricci.107 
Additionally, because the Third Circuit, as opposed to North Hudson, 
would be responsible for removing the residency requirement, North Hudson 
did not have a strong basis in evidence for fearing a lawsuit from Hispanic fire-
fighters under a disparate treatment theory.108  The court also found that ob-
taining a workforce with a higher skill set would provide North Hudson with a 
legitimate reason for eliminating the residency requirement and hiring from a 
broader applicant pool.109 
IV. NORTH HUDSON’S ALTERATIONS TO THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LANDSCAPE 
The North Hudson decision offers two important insights to practitioners 
litigating Title VII employment discrimination cases in the Third Circuit.110  
First, North Hudson suggests that the use of the Ricci defense will be extremely 
limited for defendants attempting to defeat a Title VII employment discrimina-
tion claim.111  Second, the ruling calls into question the validity of any residen-
cy requirement in municipal hiring.112 
105. See North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 484 (explaining that New Haven already adminis-
tered purportedly illegal exam and subsequently attempted to fix problem by denying promo-
tion to white and Hispanic firefighters).  The initial and remedial actions undertaken by New 
Haven created the potential for disparate impact and disparate treatment liability, respectively.  
See id. (clarifying reasoning offered by court). 
106. See id. (noting that North Hudson did not take any steps to remove its residency 
requirement or adjust its policies to minimize alleged adverse effect).  Thus, North Hudson 
was able to secure judicial guidance before being forced to take remedial measures that could 
have resulted in competing claims.  See id. (drawing factual distinction). 
107. See id. (classifying case as “classic disparate-impact claim, one that we have re-
solved based on the three-step inquiry dictated by the statute”). 
108. See id. at 484-85 (supporting factual distinction of Ricci); see also Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 
at 2681 (emphasizing that fear of litigation is insufficient to justify another form of discrimi-
nation); Wolfe v. City of Pittsburgh, 140 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing that gov-
ernment employer’s compliance with judicial mandate does not constitute official policy or 
employment practice of employer as required for liability under Title VII’s disparate treatment 
claim). 
109. See North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 485 (citing retaining of higher ranked non-resident 
applicants who possess superior merit as legitimate reason for removing residency require-
ment). 
110. For a discussion of the insights that North Hudson can provide for practitioners, 
see infra notes 113-40 and accompanying text. 
111. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s narrowing of the Ricci defense’s scope, see 
infra notes 113-28 and accompanying text. 
112. For a discussion of how North Hudson effectively invalidates residency require-
ments in the municipal hiring process, see infra notes 129-40 and accompanying text. 
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A. Walking a Thin Line: The Third Circuit Narrows the Ricci Defense 
The Third Circuit adopted a very narrow interpretation of Ricci that is con-
sistent with prior precedent.113  Perhaps this should come as no surprise given 
the prevailing scholarly criticism and strong dissenting opinion in Ricci.114  
Moreover, the narrow interpretation follows the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Briscoe, which limited Ricci’s application to its specific facts.115  As in Bris-
coe, the Third Circuit held that the Ricci defense did not apply to the reverse 
factual scenario in North Hudson; thus, it did not provide a defense that would 
permit the city to continue using the residency requirement that had caused a 
disparate impact.116 
North Hudson’s holding provides strategic advice regarding Ricci’s ap-
plicability for employment discrimination attorneys litigating Title VII cases in 
the Third Circuit.117  Practitioners defending municipalities should not rely on 
Ricci to provide a defense when presented with facts similar to North Hud-
son.118  The Ricci decision could also be interpreted, however, in a way that 
limits its application to actions causing disparate treatment claims—essentially 
restricting Ricci’s holding even when applied to its own factual scenario.119  
The Third Circuit observed that the municipality in Ricci was forced to choose 
between irreconcilable alleged errors because it issued the exam and subse-
quently refused to certify the results.120  North Hudson was not in a similar sit-
uation, the Third Circuit explained, because its only action was using a residen-
cy requirement which was shown to cause a disparate impact.121  This 
distinction demonstrates that the timing of the lawsuit in relation to a municipal-
113. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s Ricci analysis, see infra notes 114-
23 and accompanying text. 
114. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2690 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“By order of this Court, New Haven . . . must today be served—as it was in the days of un-
disguised discrimination—by a fire department in which members of racial and ethnic minori-
ties are rarely seen in command positions.”); see also Mark S. Brodin, Ricci v. DeStefano: 
The New Haven Firefighters Case & the Triumph of White Privilege, 20 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
SOC. JUST. 161 (2011) (offering strong criticism of Ricci decision). 
115. See Briscoe v. City of New Haven, 654 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2011) (relying on 
various arguments to narrow Ricci’s applicability).  The Second Circuit also based its holding 
on logical reasoning.  See id. (explaining logical fallacy that would result if Ricci defense was 
symmetrical and applied to both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims). 
116. See NAACP v. North Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 484-85 (3d Cir. 
2011) (citing Briscoe with approval for distinguishing facts of Ricci case and declining to ex-
tend strong basis in evidence standard to disparate impact claims). 
117. For a further discussion of North Hudson’s impact on litigation strategies, see infra 
notes 118-23 and accompanying text. 
118. See North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 483-85 (limiting reach of Ricci defense). 
119. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s important distinction between Ricci 
and North Hudson, see infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text. 
120. See North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 484 (distinguishing Ricci from North Hudson 
based on when municipality received judicial guidance).  In Ricci, issuing the exam that creat-
ed the racially biased results provided the basis for the disparate impact claim, and refusing to 
certify the results based on racial considerations created potential liability for a disparate 
treatment claim.  See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009) (reciting facts of case). 
121. See North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 484 (noting facts of case and how it differs from 
Ricci). 
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ity’s actions, rather than the type of suit brought first, may be an important fac-
tor in determining when the Ricci defense applies.122  Therefore, plaintiffs with 
a potential disparate treatment action should bring suit against the municipality 
before it takes any remedial measures that might allow the employer to invoke 
the Ricci defense.123 
Additionally, North Hudson’s holding reinforces Title VII’s purpose.124  
While employers facing competing Title VII discrimination claims are in a dif-
ficult position, providing a defense for one type of discrimination because an-
other type might be alleged later does not further the goal of eliminating race as 
an employment consideration.125  The law is settled that an employer cannot 
discriminate against a class of minorities just because other employers are will-
ing to hire those minorities.126  Similarly, an employer should not be able to 
discriminate against blacks on the ground that there is a strong evidentiary basis 
that not discriminating against blacks would cause discrimination against His-
panics.127  By resisting the implicit notion that some forms of discrimination 
are less detrimental to society, and therefore more acceptable, North Hudson 
supports Title VII’s purpose.128 
B. Has the Third Circuit Evicted Residency Requirements? 
In addition to limiting the Ricci defense, the Third Circuit’s decision in 
North Hudson suggests that residency requirements are presumptively void.129  
In Bayonne, the Third Circuit permitted the city to reinstate the residency re-
quirement because the city’s four-year experiment proved that the residency re-
quirement did not cause the racial disparity.130  This decision could have 
caused the Third Circuit to become more cautious and spurred the court to im-
plement a heightened causation standard in future cases.131  For instance, the 
122. See id. (suggesting that case might have come out same way even if, as in Ricci, 
disparate treatment suit were brought prior to disparate impact suit). 
123. See id. (discussing importance of lawsuit’s timing in relation to actions taken by 
municipality). For a further discussion of the court’s rejection of Ricci, see supra notes 104-09 
and accompanying text. 
124. For a further discussion of how the Third Circuit’s decision is consistent with the 
goals of Title VII, see infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. 
125. See North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 485-86 (suggesting that two wrongs do not make a 
right in employment discrimination context and that focus must remain on rooting out identi-
fied discrimination).  For a further discussion on the purpose of Title VII, see supra note 9 and 
accompanying text. 
126. See North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 486 (stating law on employment discrimination). 
127. See id. (explaining “inequities to one group accruing from remedies for discrimi-
nation against another group cannot forestall those remedies”). 
128. See id. (suggesting that Title VII cannot be reconciled with notion that threatening 
one form of discriminatory suit against employer validates contrary discriminatory practice). 
129. For a further discussion on the effect North Hudson will likely have on municipal 
residency requirements, see infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text. 
130. See NAACP v. City of Bayonne, 134 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 1998) (dismissing 
plaintiff’s case for failing to prove causal connection between residency requirement and ra-
cial disparity). 
131. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 79, at 20 (asserting that racial disparities are 
not always attributable to residency requirements, and that court should be more reluctant to 
remove them without strong evidence of causation). 
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court in North Hudson could have required stronger proof that the residency re-
quirement, and not some other factor, was indeed preventing blacks from gain-
ing employment before removing that requirement.132 
The court rejected this approach, thus suggesting that residency require-
ments will not be valid until they are removed for a trial period to determine 
whether the minority representation increases in its absence.133  With this in 
mind, municipalities in the Third Circuit should be wary of employing residen-
cy requirements in their hiring processes, and practitioners representing such 
entities should urge them to remove these requirements prior to being sued.134  
Nonetheless, lawyers defending residency requirements might succeed if they 
are able to identify other potential causes for the statistical inequality, thereby 
exposing the absence of a causal connection between the residency requirement 
and the disparity.135  Practitioners representing plaintiffs alleging that a resi-
dency requirement has created a disparate impact have an easier path forward, 
especially given North Hudson’s dismissal of Bayonne as a defense.136  These 
parties should emphasize the statistical disparities between the municipal em-
ployer and the relevant labor market in addition to establishing less discrimina-
tory alternative practices that serve the employer’s goals.137 
The Third Circuit’s decision to remove the residency requirement also 
promotes Title VII’s purpose by ensuring that employers cannot prefer one race 
over another by drawing the boundaries of such a requirement in a way that ex-
cludes certain minorities.138  Without the residency requirement as a barrier to 
applying for the job, candidates would be employed based on job qualifications 
132. See id. (arguing there is no difference between current case and Bayonne where 
removal of residency requirement was ineffective at increasing minority representation among 
firefighters). 
133. See North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 485 (striking down residency requirement after 
statistical comparison between percentage of blacks employed by fire department and per-
centage of qualified blacks in local applicant pool). 
134. See id. at 477-78 (noting court’s suspicion of residency requirements when cou-
pled with racial disparity among workforce); see also NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 940 F.2d 
792, 799-800 (3d Cir. 1991) (suggesting statistical disparities between white and minority 
employment need not be significant to invalidate residency requirement). 
135. See Bayonne, 134 F.3d at 118 (noting that plaintiffs failed to prove causal nexus 
between residency requirement and low percentage of black municipal employees).  The 
plaintiffs later admitted that the likely cause of the disparity was the New Jersey civil service 
examination.  See id. at 121 (explaining that plaintiffs failed to isolate discriminatory effect of 
challenged practice).  However, defendants in these actions face an uphill battle.  See Brief for 
Appellees at 17-18, North Hudson, 665 F.3d 464 (No. 10-3983) (discussing difficulties faced 
by municipalities who have never removed their residency requirement in rebutting inference 
that requirement caused disparate racial impact). 
136. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s potential constraint of Bayonne, see 
supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text. 
137. See North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 477-80 (highlighting extremely low minority repre-
sentation in workforce and lack of alternative causes as factors in invalidating residency re-
quirement); Harrison, 940 F.2d at 799-800 (same).  For a further discussion of less discrimi-
natory alternatives, see supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
138. See North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 470 (noting residency requirement’s impact on mi-
nority hiring); see also Harrison, 940 F.2d at 799-801 (detailing residency requirement’s per-
verse effects). 
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rather than other factors that might be racially motivated.139  Title VII does not 
force minorities to take advantage of these employment opportunities, but it 
does require that the opportunities not be restricted on account of race.140 
V. “THE PROBLEM IS FAR FROM SOLVED.  WE STILL HAVE A LONG, LONG 
WAY TO GO.”141 
The Third Circuit’s decision in North Hudson was consistent with the pur-
pose of Title VII, the Second Circuit’s holding in Briscoe with respect to the 
extent of the Ricci defense, and prior Third Circuit precedent on the validity of 
residency requirements.142  By limiting the scope of the available defenses, the 
Third Circuit augmented Title VII’s goal of ensuring that race will not bar ap-
plicants from employment.143  The Third Circuit’s distinction of Ricci on tem-
poral grounds is especially significant because it provides plaintiffs with an al-
ternative litigation angle to urge against the application of the Ricci defense, and 
it rejects the implicit argument that some forms of racial discrimination are 
more acceptable than others.144  In addition to adhering to Title VII’s goals, the 
court’s decision in North Hudson not to expand the Ricci defense was consistent 
with the approach taken by the Second Circuit on this issue.145  The Third Cir-
cuit’s decision thus creates a strong precedent that the Ricci defense is limited to 
its facts and affords certainty to litigants in this area of law.146 
Moreover, North Hudson confirms that the Third Circuit will conduct a 
scrutinizing review of residency requirements.147  The court’s decision to in-
validate the residency requirement, despite the back-tracking in Bayonne, seals 
shut any possibility of a heightened causation standard.148  With this decision, 
municipalities are on notice that use of residency requirements will result in le-
139. See North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 469 (explaining that candidates would be ranked 
and hired based on physical and written examinations). 
140. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2006) (pro-
hibiting classification of applicants in way which would deprive individual of employment 
opportunities); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009) (recognizing purpose of Title 
VII as requiring employment environment where race does not impose barrier to opportunity). 
141. Martin Luther King, Jr., Nobel Lecture: The Quest for Peace and Justice (Dec. 11, 
1964), available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1964/king-
lecture.html. 
142. For a further discussion of how the Third Circuit’s decision comported with prior 
precedent, see supra notes 113-40 and accompanying text. 
143. For a further discussion supporting the assertion that the Third Circuit’s holding 
was consistent with the goals and policies of Title VII, see supra notes 113-28 and accompa-
nying text. 
144. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s distinction of Ricci based on when 
the city took certain actions and when the suit was brought, see supra notes 117-28 and ac-
companying text. 
145. For a further discussion of how the Third Circuit’s analysis was consistent with 
that of the Second Circuit, see supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
146. For a further discussion of the analysis employed in North Hudson compared to 
that employed in Briscoe, see supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
147. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s inquiry into residency requirements, 
see supra notes 129-40 and accompanying text. 
148. For a discussion of how North Hudson extinguishes the possibility of a heightened 
causation standard under Bayonne, see supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text. 
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gal challenges.149  In conclusion, North Hudson’s constraint of the Ricci de-
fense removes an arrow from the quiver of defense attorneys in employment 
discrimination cases and tosses significant doubt on the validity of residency 
requirements used in the context of public hiring.150 
149. For a further discussion predicting the impact that North Hudson will have on mu-
nicipalities, see supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text. 
150. For a further discussion of North Hudson’s likely impact, see supra notes 110-40 
and accompanying text. 
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